The F-35 Money Pit

Rethinking 'Inevitable' Choices in European Defense

Mar 04, 2025

F-35 flying — Photo by Arturo Alvarez on Unsplash

The recent Munich Security Conference sent tremors through European defense ministries. Vice President Vance's comments questioning NATO commitments, coupled with former President Trump's revisionist statements about Ukraine's war responsibility, have forced a painful reassessment: Just how reliable is the American security guarantee that underpins European defense planning?

This question gains particular urgency as European nations continue committing to the F-35 fighter program. Romania's recent $6.4 billion procurement of 32 aircraft stands in curious contrast to growing concerns about American reliability. Yet this apparent contradiction reveals a deeper truth: The presentation of the F-35 as Europe's "inevitable" choice was always more political calculation than technical necessity.

The presentation of the F-35 as Europe's "inevitable" choice was always more political calculation than technical necessity.

The American Reliability Question

As explored in our analysis of the 2025 Munich Security Conference, America’s shift in rhetoric about European security marks a profound transformation. When senior US officials at Munich suggest NATO members should spend 5% of GDP on defense – nearly double the current target – they're not simply discussing budget allocations. They're signaling a fundamental restructuring of the transatlantic relationship that has underpinned European security for over seven decades.

This shift goes beyond mere burden-sharing debates. Trump's recent reframing of Ukraine's war as self-inflicted represents more than campaign rhetoric – it suggests a deeper reevaluation of American security guarantees. For frontline states like Poland and the Baltic nations, this introduces existential questions: If American leaders can retroactively justify abandoning Ukraine, what guarantees exist for NATO's eastern members? When does "burden-sharing" become burden-shifting?

The nuclear dimension adds another layer of complexity. The F-35's role in NATO nuclear sharing has been presented as technically irreplaceable, a critical link in the chain of extended deterrence. Yet this too represents a political choice masquerading as technical necessity. France's nuclear-capable Rafale demonstrates that alternatives exist. More importantly, the reliability of American nuclear guarantees – once considered absolute – now faces the same scrutiny as conventional commitments.

This uncertainty creates a strategic paradox. European nations are simultaneously more dependent on American security guarantees (as Russian aggression continues) and less certain about their reliability. The F-35 embodies this contradiction: it represents both the peak of NATO interoperability and a deepening of dependence on potentially unreliable guarantees.

Romania's recent F-35 procurement and Poland's expanded order might seem to ignore these concerns. However, they could equally represent an effort to bind American interests more tightly to European security – creating interdependencies to offset uncertainty. Yet this strategy assumes that technical and military integration can overcome shifting political winds in Washington.

The Independence Mirage

Europe's apparent alternatives to the F-35 reveal how technological interdependence undermines traditional notions of sovereignty. Sweden's Gripen, often presented as a sovereign European option, depends fundamentally on American F414 engines. This isn't merely a supply chain detail – it represents a critical vulnerability. Engine access and maintenance require ongoing American approval, creating potential chokepoints that could ground entire fleets during crises.

The Eurofighter's combat systems rely heavily on US-made components, from mission computers to weapons interfaces. Even its DASS Defensive Aids Sub-System uses Intel processors subject to US export controls. When German politicians advocate for the Eurofighter as a "sovereign" alternative to the F-35, they gloss over these deep technological dependencies.

France's Rafale, despite being proudly marketed as an independent European fighter, still contains American elements requiring export licenses. MBDA's Meteor missile, a key component of European air combat capability, shares guidance components with Raytheon, necessitating US re-export approvals. The myth of complete independence dissolves under technical scrutiny.

This technological entanglement mirrors Europe's broader defense relationship with America – neither complete independence nor total dependence, but a complex web of interdependencies that complicates strategic autonomy. The success of Europe's Galileo navigation system proves that technical independence is possible, but at significant cost and with sustained political will. Yet even Galileo's achievement highlights the challenge: it took decades and billions of euros to replicate a capability that already existed, just to ensure strategic autonomy.

The next generation of European fighters faces even greater challenges. The Franco-German FCAS and British-led Tempest programs aim for greater independence, but development costs potentially exceeding €80 billion raise questions about economic viability. Moreover, emerging technologies like AI and advanced materials often have dual-use implications that trigger US export controls, potentially creating new dependencies even as old ones are solved.

This creates a sobering reality: true independence would require not just developing alternative platforms, but rebuilding entire industrial ecosystems – from semiconductor fabrication to specialized materials production. The cost would be astronomical, potentially exceeding Europe's political appetite for defense spending even at increased levels.

Real Choices vs. Convenient Narratives

Norway's current struggles with F-35 integration offer a revealing window into the gap between procurement decisions and practical outcomes. The Norwegian Office of the Auditor General's "highly objectionable" assessment of the country's F-35 program isn't merely about project management – it exposes fundamental questions about sovereignty and capability that all European states must confront.

Norway's challenges span multiple dimensions. The country lacks adequate sustainment infrastructure for its F-35 fleet. Its training pipelines remain incomplete. Its mission-planning systems face integration hurdles. Most tellingly, these issues were flagged in a classified 2019 review but persist in 2025, suggesting that even wealthy, technologically sophisticated European states struggle with the complexity of modern fighter programs.

This situation exposes the false dichotomy in European defense choices. The real decision isn't simply between F-35 procurement and European alternatives, but between different models of military capability and sovereignty:

High-End Integration vs. Practical Defense

- The F-35 represents the pinnacle of networked warfare capability, but requires deep integration with American systems and doctrine

- Norway's experience shows how this integration creates dependencies that go far beyond the aircraft itself, touching everything from maintenance procedures to pilot training

- The alternative isn't necessarily a less capable European fighter, but potentially a different approach to air power altogether

Cost vs. Control

- Romania's $6.4 billion commitment for 32 F-35s appears straightforward on paper

- Yet Norway's experience suggests the true cost includes rebuilding entire military support structures

- European alternatives might cost more upfront but offer greater control over operating costs and deployment decisions

Capability vs. Autonomy

- The F-35's superior capabilities come with strings attached – from US approval for software updates to dependence on American maintenance protocols

- European alternatives like the Gripen offer lower capability but potentially greater operational autonomy

- Norway's struggles highlight how "capability" on paper doesn't always translate to practical military value

These aren't primarily technical questions but political ones, wrapped in the language of military necessity. When German officials reversed course to procure F-35s despite domestic pressure for Eurofighters, they weren't just selecting an aircraft – they were choosing a particular vision of European defense integration. I suspect they are regretting this choice right now.

The Norwegian case demonstrates how these choices cascade through military organizations, creating path dependencies that last decades. Their difficulties achieving full operational capability by 2025 aren't merely technical hurdles; they represent the practical consequences of choosing high-end capability over operational autonomy.

Looking Forward

European leaders face an uncomfortable reality: Neither complete dependence on American systems nor costly pursuit of independence offers a perfect solution. The F-35's technical superiority is real, but so are the risks of depending on potentially unreliable partners. European alternatives exist but require accepting either reduced capabilities or continued technological dependence.

This leaves Europe at a crossroads. Will states continue investing in American-dependent systems while building parallel European capabilities? Or will growing uncertainty about American commitments drive investment in truly independent alternatives, regardless of cost?

Perhaps the most dangerous choice would be avoiding this difficult discussion by continuing to treat the F-35 as inevitable rather than what it is: a political choice with profound implications for European sovereignty and security.

The answer may lie not in choosing between American dependence and European independence, but in clearly acknowledging these decisions as political choices rather than technical necessities. Only then can Europe have an honest discussion about what kind of defense independence it needs – and what price it's willing to pay to achieve it.

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